The Road to War: Honor
Peter Schultz
The
road to war, politically speaking, is paved with good, i.e., honorable intentions.
Hence, making war is so much more popular than making peace or avoiding war. It
is the nature of the political.
In
his book, What’s the Matter with Kansas, Thomas Frank offered an
assessment of conservative voters in Kansas that led to the conclusion that
those voters had voted against their own self-interests. Hence, they had voted
irrationally, implying that they and the conservative movement were beyond rational
appeals and hopelessly askew politically.
But
that these voters were not voting irrationally is evident when it is recognized
that, politically speaking, “means” often become or are “ends.” Those voters perceived
themselves as voting honorably, as voting for “the honorable” as opposed to and
even at the expense of their self-interests. So, they had demonstrated their
virtue(s), their patriotism, their good citizenship in that they preferred the
common good to their self-interests. As such, voting is not simply a means to
advance one’s self-interest; it is an end in itself, a demonstration of one’s
virtue(s), political and otherwise.
This
is a reminder that honor is a commodity that easily trumps self-interest
politically. Self-interest may dictate abandoning losing causes, like wars, but
honor does not. In fact, honor dictates persisting even in losing causes,
including wars, because such persistence demonstrates one’s virtue(s). Appeasement
based on calculation can always be made to seem dishonorable. Which is why making
war is so much more popular than making peace via appeasement.
When
trying to get the United States out of Vietnam, JFK used statistics,
duplicitously as it turned out, to persuade people that it was in the interests
of the United States to get out or stay out of Vietnam militarily. Apparently,
JFK knew that his statistics gave an inaccurate picture of the military and
political situations in Vietnam. And as it turned out to be the case, Kennedy’s
prospects of keeping the US out of Vietnam dimmed considerably.
Additionally,
though, in arguing as he did in favor of what he said was statistically
validated “progress,” JFK had, implicitly, embraced the war’s legitimacy, that
it was an honorable war. If opposing communism was honorable, as almost all
Americans thought then, the war was honorable. So even if it were not going
well and even if South Vietnam itself was not essential to the national
security of the United States, the war itself, as opposed to its possible
outcomes, was honorable. To oppose the war would be to act dishonorably. And were
a president to act so dishonorably, unconscionable consequences might be forthcoming.