Thoughts on "Thoughts"

  

Thoughts on Thoughts

Peter Schultz

 

                  From Leo Strauss’s book Thoughts on Machiavelli: “Machiavelli … takes issue explicitly and coherently with the traditional and customary view according to which the prince ought to live virtuously and ought to rule virtuously.” [59] But despite this, “the political prerequisites of Italy’s liberation [are] withheld because Machiavelli desired to keep the noble and shining end untarnished by the base and dark means … indispensable to its achievement.” [67]

 

                  This seems to make sense except Machiavelli might have not thought that that “noble and shining end” was illusionary insofar as established ways require “base and dark means” to be maintained. Insofar as that is the case, one should wonder about whether liberating or unifying Italy, as well as all established orders, is so noble and shining. Living virtuously and ruling virtuously are luxuries that princes cannot afford. And, yet, appearing to do so is indispensable.

 

                  Further, the liberation of Italy would not be “spontaneous.” It would require “a policy of iron and poison, of murder and treachery, … the extermination of Italian princely families and the destruction of Italian republican cities…. The liberation of Italy means a completer revolution…, above all else a revolution in thinking about right and wrong, [learning] that the patriotic end hallows every means however much condemned by the most exalted traditions of both philosophy and religion.” [67-8]

 

So, “cruelty well used,” as engaged in by Cesare Borgia, does not seem to be enough. After all, “Cesare’s successes ultimately benefitted only the Church and thus increased the obstacles to the conquest or liberation of Italy.” Further, “Cesare was a mere tool of Alexander VI and hence, a mere tool of the papacy…. For Cesare’s power was base on the power of the papacy. That power failed him when Alexander died.”

 

                  Which means that Cesare’s power was not based on “cruelty well used.” And the argument that it was is merely what Strauss calls the “traditional exterior” of Machiavelli’s thought. It was, as Machiavelli’s examples make clear, known, well known the ancients as well to almost anyone who engaged in politics. But the “revolutionary center” of Machiavelli’s thought is something different altogether.

 

                  In the “traditional exterior” of Machiavelli’s thought, he presents himself as seeking “to found a pagan Rome, a Rome destined to become again the most glorious republic and the seminar and the heart of the most glorious empire.” But this assumes that Machiavelli actually or finally thought that pagan Rome was “a most glorious republic” and a “most glorious empire.” If this is the case, then it is fair to say Machiavelli’s thought wasn’t revolutionary; it was in fact reactionary.

 

                  By focusing on and embracing as he does on “cruelty well used,” Machiavelli is focused on means, obscuring that genuine revolutions require new ends. Cesare was “a mere tool of Alexander” and “of the papacy” because he didn’t dispute and reject the Church and its ends. And so, despite his “cruelty well used,” his “successes … benefitted only the Church.” Insofar as Italy – and other places as well – could not be conquered or liberated without challenging and rejecting the modes and orders established by the Church, by Christianity that is, just so far than no genuine revolution would be possible. The same may be said of the modes and orders that had been established by pagan Rome and even those established by the likes of Plato and Aristotle.

The Politics of Scandal

  

The Politics of Scandals

Peter Schultz

 

                  Scandals are common in politics, so it is worthwhile to speculate about them and their relationship to what Aristotle labeled “regimes.”

 

                  For example, do scandals fortify the status quo or not? Conventionally speaking, scandals are understood as threatening the status quo or the existing regime and, yet, we have experienced what have been called “teflon presidents,” and currently have a president who has bragged that he is virtually immune from the bad effects of scandalous behavior. Insofar as Trump is correct, what does this tell us about scandals and politics? That scandals are not as dangerous as they are often thought to be, is this just the result of successful cover-ups or is something else going on here?

 

                  It is possible that scandals do not controversialize regimes; that is, they fit in regimes in ways that fortify the status quo by hiding the controversial character of a regime, of any regime. For example, how did people feel as the Watergate scandal occurred? As it was revealed, they were relieved as reflected by President Ford’s comment after Nixon resigned that “Our national nightmare is over.” So, whatever had happened during Watergate, it did not make Americans doubt the existing regime, their way of life politically. “Dirty tricks” were part of the American regime. Certainly, Nixon’s actions were shocking, but this did not lead to dissatisfaction with how America did politics. Watergate was more like a horror movie: Shocking behavior, to be sure, but not dangerously delusional social behavior that called into question how we live as a people or as a nation.

 

                  And so, there are two responses to scandals: one is covering up and the other is exposing and punishing the responsible parties. So, cover ups become normal behavior, even when they don’t make much sense, and investigations end up looking for “smoking guns,” i.e., for individual culpability or criminality. Very few are upset by cover ups because it is what culpable, criminal individuals always do, are expected to do.

 

                  Ironically then, turning something into a scandal is the first step for fortifying the established regime. It is a rather safe bet that almost every scandal will result in a reinforcement, a fortification of the established regime, of the status quo. In fact, there is nothing like a good scandal for fortifying the existing regime, the prevailing way of life.

 

                  If you doubt this, ask yourself: Why did Richard Nixon become an “elder statesman,” one that presidents should consult politically? Or: Why is Tony Blair now being taken as someone to consult about war? Ditto for George W. Bush and others.

 

                  Like so much else in politics, scandals are often disguises that blind us to the real character of the political, which is an arena characterized by smoke and mirrors that hide the fact that force and fraud are intrinsic to politics. As Machiavelli pointed out, those who “learn to be able not to be good” are the most successful politicians, even the most successful human beings. So, remarkably, many have risen to great heights politically despite scandals. And this is one reason why the political and the ironic have been said to go together very well. Understanding politics requires expertise, to be sure. But it also requires a sense of humor.

                                   

Regime Concept

  

Regime Concept

Peter Schultz

 

                  From JFK and Vietnam: report on Nam when JFK assumed the presidency: “an extremely vivid and well written account of a place going to hell in a hack….”

 

(1)     Decision made, acceptance follows, ala’ el jefe. The die was cast, with the war to follow. So it goes.

(2)     That Vietnam was “going to hell in a hack:” no one ever came close to questioning this; accepted by all as if it were a self-evident truth, unquestionable. Why? The regime made this assessment seem to be self-evidently true, unquestionable.

 

Perhaps this is what Aristotle meant by regime being “a way of life.” Something like Quinn’s Mother Culture. Regimes determine what people take to be real. America’s regime, its way of life, its way of living led Americans to accept without question that Vietnam was going to hell, even though many Vietnamese didn’t think that. But then the Vietnamese didn’t live like Americans. Different regime, different way of life, different truth.

Technologically Advanced Barbarism

  

Technologically Advanced Barbarism

Peter Schultz

 

"Chris Hedges’ recent speech at Princeton is not simply a commentary on the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran — it is a sweeping indictment of a global order collapsing into what he calls “technologically advanced barbarism.” 

 

https://consortiumnews.com/2026/04/03/chris-hedges-the-new-world-order/

 

Chris Hedges is correct: The world order is experiencing “technologically advanced barbarism.” Or, as some would put it, in order to get to the bottom of things: what we are experiencing is “technologically advanced politics” because “barbarism” is intrinsic to, indistinguishable from politics. By labeling what he is calling “a new world order” “barbarism,” Hedges is laying the groundwork for affirming the political. Ironically, affirming the political points in the direction of “barbarism.” And if that sounds strange, just review in your mind how the US has waged continuous war since the end of WW II, all for the sake of peace, prosperity, and progress. Or, review in your mind how its greatness was built on the backs and corpses of slaves and the indigenous. 

 

Trump's Trap

  

Trump’s Trap

Peter Schultz

 

This headline almost has it right.

"Trapped by His Own Image: Trump's Iran War and The Politics of Ego"  

 

                  Trump is trapped, but it isn’t only because of his ego. He is also trapped by the presidency or, more generally, the American political order. That order, despite repeated denials by many, is geared toward war. It isn’t “the politics of ego” that has Trump trapped; rather, it is the politics of war. And the politics of war is intrinsic to the American political order.

 

                  JFK, allegedly, couldn’t pull out of Vietnam before the 1964 presidential election because he would, he was convinced, lose that election. He also could not squash the Bay of Pigs invasion and although it proved to be a fiasco, his popularity rose as a result. Similarly, LBJ couldn’t pull out of Nam because he was convinced that he would lose the 1968 election had he done so. And, of course, Nixon continued the war for four years in order to secure his reelection in 1972, even telling the Chinese that he was prepared to lose that war provided there was a “decent interval” before the North Vietnamese won.

 

                  There is little need to list all the examples of presidents being “trapped” into wars, but some examples are: Truman in Korea; Carter in Afghanistan and Iraq; Reagan in Nicaragua; Bush Sr. in Kuwait; Clinton bombing Iraq on a daily basis; Bush Jr. in Afghanistan and Iraq, and so on and so on and so on. War is a continuing presidential phenomenon.

 

                  We do not have an “ego problem,” but a political problem; what one might call “a regime problem.” As some of those who opposed the Constitution when it was being debated argued, it has “an awful squinting,” it squints in the direction of monarchy and of war. Or as Ben Franklin is reputed to have said when asked what the new Constitution created: “A republic if you can keep it.” We haven’t, but then Franklin might have been being kind in his assessment. 250 years later, the proof is in the pudding or, as my mother use to say regarding human beings, “the fruit don’t fall to far from the tree.”

Trump: A Psychological and Political Phenomenon

  

Trump: A Psychological and Political Phenomenon

Peter Schultz

 

                  Is Trump a reflection or result of a psychological problem or of a political problem? Which is more clarifying: Treating Trump as a psychological or as a political phenomenon?

 

                  Obviously, both phenomena are operative because Trump has a psychological profile and a political profile. So, this isn’t an either/or question.

 

                  Psychologically, Trump is clearly narcissist. He has an inflated ego that allows him to believe he is always justified in his actions and, for that reason, believes he has been rewarded with status and wealth. Moreover, he believes that his enemies, when they defeat him, are only able to do so by means of unfair, covert actions. Their victories are never merited.

 

                  Politically, Trump is pretty much mainstream, despite his attempts to present himself as something else. His commitment to greatness has been a constant commitment of US elites since at least 1789, when the Constitution was first implemented. “Empire,” as in “an American empire,” was a constant theme in elite rhetoric and was reflected by such actions as Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory from the French. It was also reflected by the continuation of slavery and in wars against indigenous peoples in America. Generally, and consistently, wars followed the implementation of the Constitution as US elites universally agreed that the US deserved to be and would be a great nation.

 

This greatness had different and intertwined roots: European/white supremacy, Christianity, evangelical religions, modern science, capitalism, and liberal progressivism. The depth of the commitment to greatness, achieved through war, was illustrated by America’s Civil War, fought to “preserve the Union” as the basis of America’s greatness. Once that was achieved, the South was allowed to re-create a form of slavery and an apartheid system that lasted for a century and more. Greatness, being the goal, it was to be achieved even at the expense of justice or human rights.

 

As Trump has embraced greatness, it may be said that his psychological profile, his narcissism has political roots. So, what is needed is a critique and rejection of greatness, insofar as this appeals even to most of Trump’s enemies. As Socrates recommended to Athens, i.e., to Periclean Athens, the US needs to turn inward, turning away from “foreign affairs” – as they are quaintly called – and away from citizenship, and turning toward making souls the best possible.

 

Empire as Virtue

  

Empire as Virtue

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following passage is from a book entitled The Rule of Empires, by Timothy H. Parsons.

 

                  “This reading of history ignores the essential characteristic of empire: the permanent rule and exploitation of a defeated people by a conquering power. By their very nature, empires can never be – and never were – humane, liberal, or tolerant. Would-be Caesars throughout history sought glory, land, and, most importantly, plunder. The true nature of empire was more obvious in pre-modern times when it was unnecessary to disguise such base motives. In recent centuries, however, imperial conquerors have tried to hide their naked self-interest by promising to rule for the good of their subjects. This was and always will be a cynical and hypocritical canard. Empire has never been more than naked self-interest masquerading as virtue.” [4]

 

                  A question: What if, in fact, empire is or reflects virtue? That is, so far from being “naked self-interest masquerading as virtue,” empire is virtue itself. Which is what makes it so appealing. Human beings, universally, want to be virtuous, perhaps more than anything else. And in their quest to be virtuous, they seek to dominate, to rule, and to seek glory by ameliorating the human condition politically.

 

                  Insofar as this is the case, the issue is or should be virtue, not empire. If, as Parsons so aptly argues and illustrates, empires have been, are, and will be intolerable to their subjects because violently oppressive, then virtue should be investigated. A politics of virtue, e.g., politics as soul craft as so many espouse might have consequences that will not be, that cannot be “humane, liberal, or tolerant.” Perhaps the crafting of souls, making our souls the best possible as Socrates recommended, should not and cannot be done politically. Good persons and good citizens are, for all practical purposes, distant, even conflicting phenomena, always.