More on the Quagmire of American Politics
P. Schultz
June 22, 2014
Presently,
I am reading a book by Benjamin Ginsberg entitled, “Downsizing Democracy,” in
which Ginsburg argues that our democracy has been “personalized” when once it
was “politicized.” Ginsberg describes himself as a cynic and, indeed, he is and
a thoughtful one at that. His argument that our government has been built in
such a way since the rise of the Progressives that it no longer needs to rely
on mobilizing the people to govern makes a lot of sense.
Especially
telling is his noticing that although our political elites pretend to be deeply
divided and although there are a lot of people who don’t vote, neither of the
two major parties shows any interest in increasing the size of the active
electorate. “Divided government and political stalemate seem more acceptable to
party elites than an effort to shift the balance by activating the politically
inert.” [p. 49-50] And he goes on: “Only occasional political outsiders like
Minnesota governor Jesse Ventura makes any real effort to bring non-voters into
the electorate. Neither of the major parties supports electoral reforms such as
the elimination of voter registration requirements or a shift from weekday to
weekend voting….The parties’ apparent indifference to this enormous reservoir
of potential voters is especially curious in light of the bitter conflicts that
divide them….and the inconclusive outcomes of recent electoral contests.” [p.
49]
This is all
well and good. Yet at times, Ginsberg is just too conventional in his analysis.
For example, he sees LBJ’s “gradual escalation” of the war in Vietnam as an
“effort to sustain consensus among Democrats” and cites Joseph Califano as his
source. LBJ’s strategy, by this view, allegedly backfired because as
“escalation followed escalation…federal funds flowed away from the War on
Poverty to the war in Vietnam.” [p. 70] This strengthened the “resurgent
conservative forces in Congress [whose] support for…Vietnam was a federal
retreat from social engineering at home.” [Ibid.]
Now this
implies that LBJ had no choice: He had to satisfy these conservatives if he was
to continue the Vietnam War. But why did he have to continue that war? Why not
go with those who wanted out of Vietnam, some of whom were even members of
Johnson’s cabinet? Ginsberg doesn’t answer this question directly but he points
us toward an answer.
As Ginsberg
notes in passing, some of those opposed to the war were “student radicals.”
That is, they represented a brand of politics LBJ rejected, a brand that his
“Great Society” was meant to co-opt. Surprisingly because he is a cynic,
Ginsberg does not entertain the possibility that the Great Society was intended
to co-opt or avoid more radical possibilities, such as Black Power and “sex,
drugs, and rock n’ roll,” to use a shorthand.
LBJ had to
stay in Vietnam not for Vietnam’s sake but to maintain the prevailing and
predominant political class and its brand of politics, both of which were
threatened by the unrest evident in society in the 60s. And this was a brand of
politics and a class of politicians that included the Mayor Daley’s of Chicago.
Thus, it could be said that LBJ’s “gradual escalation” did not backfire but
succeeded. It led, ultimately, to the election of Richard Nixon and who better
to turn to in order to continue and reinforce the ruling political class and
its brand of politics?
Of course,
later it became necessary to get rid of Nixon, of “Tricky Dick,” and to do so
without upsetting the established too much. This was a “trick” that outdid
anything that “Tricky Dick” ever did, at least up to that time. But then, still
later, it was useful, and especially useful as it was done under President
Clinton, the baby boomer president and former draft dodger, to “resurrect” or
“rehabilitate” Richard Nixon as a “statesman.” And with that magic trick, the
existing political order seemed to come full circle.
Now, this
is cynicism, is it not? But that doesn’t make it wrong.
No comments:
Post a Comment