American Foreign Policy and Andrew Jackson
P. Schultz
September 5, 2014
Here is a response I wrote to a friend based on a link he sent, an
article by Peter Beinart entitled “Pursuing ISIS to the Gates of Hell.” Here is
the link:
Here is my response to Beinart:
“Well, first, I love the way some people, usually academics, create
categories, usually multiple [because that proves how smart they are], that
they then use to analyze stuff. Of course, they are often unaware that their
alleged complexity is really a way of obscuring what might be called the
obvious. I think Beinart has managed to do this here. Also, with his four
categories, he can pretend to have "discovered" something
"new" that is taking place, viz., the rising of
"Jacksonianism," as he calls it, as our "new" foreign
policy. I wish to say that I don't see anything "new" here as one
could have heard the same rhetoric about, say, Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh, as one
is hearing now about ISIS. It is all smoke and mirrors which serves to fortify
the prevailing ideology of "leadership" and "power,"
especially military power. If it weren't so dangerous, it would be silly.
“Second: "Jacksonianism" as described by Beinart resembles
what Jackson was about as much as I resemble a young man. Here is Beinart:
"It refers to the peculiar combination of jingoism and isolationism
forged on the American frontier. Bill O’Reilly is a Jacksonian. Jacksonians
don’t want to fashion other countries in America’s image. They don’t care about
fattening corporate bottom lines. But if you mess with them—violate their
honor—they’ll pursue you to the gates of hell."
“I really don't
even know where to start on this. Jackson waged a "war" on the
national government, by some assessments an even more aggressive war on that
government than Jefferson did. Why? Because he knew that such a government was
the seedbed of an inegalitarian society, based on a growing economy that would
benefit the few at the expense of the many. He tried to disempower the national
bureaucracy by means of what is now known as the "spoils system." He
set up a "kitchen cabinet" in order to disempower the formal cabinet.
And he, with Van Buren's help, established a presidential nominating system,
national presidential nominating conventions, that produced (a) party men for
presidents and (b), not accidentally, mediocrities for president. The primary
criterion for the presidency became party loyalty, not national reputation, not
military glory, and certainly not charisma. Party loyalists are less dangerous
than those men motivated by overweening ambition, men like those Hamilton
looked to to fill the presidency, men characterized by "a love of fame,
the ruling passion of the noblest minds."
“How would such presidents conduct foreign policy? Well, not
jingoistically. And not to reap the glory that comes from democratizing the
world. [Here Beinart is accurate about Jackson not wanting "to fashion
other countries in America's image."] Rather, they would practice a
mundane foreign policy, which is not to say "isolationist." A mundane
foreign policy would strike most today as merely "weak," and of
course viewed in light of our prevailing ideology, it is weak. [Of course, my
analysis is abstracting from the slavery issue, which makes it less than
persuasive. Witness James K. Polk's war with Mexico, a war that was undertaken
in part to try to create more slave states and, thereby, protect that institution
against attacks upon it.]
“Anyway, Beinart wants to make a point which I think needs to be
made. However, he should do so in a way that does not obscure the consensus
that underlies our current foreign policy and in a way that does not distort
our history.”
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