Watergate, Richard Nixon, and American Politics
Peter Schultz
To being
nowhere near the beginning of this piece, I will point out that American
politicians, perhaps like all politicians, are managers, meaning they want to manage issues, address them, meaning
in ways meant to preserve or fortify their power. So, for example, with regard
to race, the issues are handled, managed in ways meant to maintain and fortify
the power of the politicians involved. Hence, at times, this would mean passing
civil rights legislation; while at other times it would mean criminal justice
“reforms” that lead to the mass incarceration of racial minorities. What
dictates how issues are managed or handled are calculations about which means
will best deal with the issue while preserving or extending the power of the
politicians involved.
For similar
reasons, any election results must be managed in order to deal with the issues
the elections revolved around while preserving the power of those invested in
the prevailing order. Such managing is necessary because all elections are
potentially disruptive, but especially those elections that occur in the midst
of widespread popular unrest, dissatisfaction, anger, or even rage. So, finally
coming the point of this essay, after the 1968 presidential election, the Nixon
administration had to be managed even while it was attempting to manage the
affairs of the nation. Politics is, in this sense, a two way street. This was
especially true in 1968 given the popular unrest that then existed and given
that Nixon’s politics represented his desire to change the existing alignment
of political forces. Beyond this, there was the fact that Nixon had never been
accepted as a member in good standing in those forces that were socially and
politically dominant, forces represented by the likes of the Washington Post
and the New York Times. He was, in brief, looked upon suspiciously. He knew
this and it affected him repeatedly.
From this
perspective, Watergate and Nixon’s resignation from the presidency was not, as
it is so often portrayed, a purification, a cleansing of the American political,
an act of statesmanship that rescued American democracy. Rather, it was an
illustration of the certain political forces who were seeking to protect
themselves, their power, and the system that conveyed their status upon them. They
were resisting Nixon, yes; but their resistance was against Nixon and his
politics that would have represented significant political changes were Nixon
successful. It was useful to present Nixon as a fundamentally flawed
individual, driven by his insecurities to try to undermine American democracy. But
actually the oligarchic forces that had prevailed prior to Nixon’s presidency
were trying to protect themselves and their power. If they happened to protect
American democracy as a result that was not their primary objective. They
weren’t trying to protect American democracy; they were trying to protect
themselves.
This
doesn’t mean that Nixon was seeking democratic changes to offset the oligarchic
forces that were opposed to him. Nixon was no more a democrat than were his
opponents. But his politics represented a threat to a broad swath of the
existing powers that controlled or tried to control US politics, forces like
those in the mainstream media like the Washington Post and the NY Times, the
military, corporate elites, and “the Club” in Washington, D.C. Nixon’s “New
Majority,” which was said to appear in full force in the 1972 presidential
election, had to be handled, be managed by these powers because otherwise they
were facing displacement by Nixon’s “New Majority.”
Because
Nixon knew that his policies, which he claimed were underwritten by that New
Majority, were a threat to the existing order, he also knew that he had to
proceed secretly or covertly if he were to be successful. He knew, for example,
that he wouldn’t be able to leave Vietnam outright or early in his first term
because he knew that the south would then fall and he would be blamed for
“losing South Vietnam” and probably not be re-elected. So he had to extend the
war, continue it until he as re-elected or almost re-elected, after which he
would be immune from the consequences of a Communist reunification of Vietnam.
Of course, he could not pursue such a strategy openly, given the intense
opposition that had arisen against the war, and so he pursued it secretly,
keeping it a secret even from the military, parts of which were still committed
to victory in Vietnam.
Similarly,
Nixon knew that his “opening” to Communist China would be opposed, intensely
opposed, and were he to make his strategy public, his opponents would do all
they could to undermine it. He had to present it as an accomplished fact and
this required the utmost secrecy. His opponents were spread across the political
spectrum, as they included both right-wing Republicans and anti-Communist
Democrats like Henry Jackson, not to mention anti-Communists in the military
like Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Moorer. Thus, secrecy was of paramount importance
to Nixon’s China policy and had to be maintained even against the likes of
Nixon’s own Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird.
Nixon’s
Soviet policy of “détente” was represented most importantly by his search for mutually
agreeable limitations on strategic arms, hence, the SALT agreements he
negotiated with the Soviets. But the strategic arms limitations policies could
not be hidden because they necessarily involved treaties and treaties have to
be ratified by the Senate and, hence, publicly debated. But Nixon knew he would
again be opposed by both right-wing Republicans and anti-Communist Democrats
and, hence, he would have to try to outflank these forces, which he managed to
do for a little while. That is, he did so until his “Watergate troubles” began
and were eventually placed front and center by Nixon’s opponents, some of them
who were like Alexander Haig pretending to be in Nixon’s camp. To think that
Nixon’s “Watergate troubles” had nothing to do with opposition to his policies
would be, in a word, naïve.
And, generally,
to think of Watergate as having little or nothing to do with Nixon’s politics
would be just as naïve. Given the threat that Nixon posed to some of the most
powerful forces in D.C., a threat enhanced by Nixon’s landslide victory in the
1972 presidential election, Nixon had to be managed, handled, including even
forcing him out of the presidency and sending him disgraced into a kind of
exile in San Clemente. Nixon, of course, did much to help his opponents dispose
of him as president, most importantly by obstructing justice while trying to
cover up Republican participation if the Watergate burglaries. But beyond that
Nixon had a good deal of help, for example, from his chief of staff, Alexander
Haig and even some from Henry Kissinger, not to mention John Dean, in helping
his opponents remove him from office. Yes, a time would come when Nixon could
be rehabilitated as an “elder statesman,” but only when he was old and had no
real political power. And even then, Nixon’s rehabilitation did not include real
acceptance. President Clinton tried to do that but if he succeeded, he only did
so at Nixon’s funeral. Dead presidents, here Nixon, can be safely praised.
So far was
Watergate from being a cleansing, a purification of a political order that had
been corrupted by Nixon, who sought to impose his will on America by secret and
covert means, it was in reality an illustration of some powerful political
forces protecting themselves, their power, and the system which made them what
they were. During Watergate and after, the media, for example, was presented as
helping to save democracy, when in fact the likes of Woodward and Bernstein,
for example, were fed by the likes of Mark Felt, an FBI bigwig, and more
importantly by Alexander Haig, a four-star general whom Woodward had briefed
when both worked at the Pentagon. Woodward and Bernstein and others, even many
others, were working for and with those forces that were most threatened by
Nixon and his politics.
Just by the
by, as it were, during the Iran Contra scandal, when the media seemed to go out
of its way to protect the Reagan administration from any thoughts of
impeachment or resignation, the media had only changed its tactics, not its
goal, which was to protect those powerful forces supporting the Reagan
administration and its politics. So, while it looked like the “muck-raking”
media of the Watergate years had changed, becoming accommodationists in the
80s, these looks were deceiving insofar as the media’s goal was the same in the
70s and the 80s, to protect some of the most powerful political forces in D.C.
The goal was the same; only the means had changed.
Today, the
question should be asked: Will ridding ourselves of Trump represent a cleansing,
a purification of the American political order or just another protective – and
reactionary – oligarchic operation? No doubt, should Biden prevail in the 2020
presidential election, the media will tout it as a cleansing, a purification of
that order. But given Biden’s status as a penultimate insider, no more controversial
than Gerry Ford was when he was appointed Nixon’s vice president, it seems
doubtful that there is or will be much cleansing going on. The prevailing but
floundering oligarchy will be restored, just as other powerful forces were
restored when, as Gerry Ford put it after Nixon’s resignation, “Our long
national nightmare has ended.’ But then there are nightmares and there are
nightmares. For me, the most frightening nightmare is one in which those
powerful forces are celebrated as democratic forces and the oligarchy rolls on
and on and on.
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