Valentine, the CIA, and Political Life
Peter Schultz
Douglas Valentine,
in his book The CIA as Organized Crime, argues that “America has been in
an ideological state of siege since 9/11…[after which] all moral and psychological
prohibitions…were lifted forever. All the anger and frustration…nurtured during
the Vietnam War and the Carter and Clinton administrations was unleashed in a torrent
of war mongering.” [293]
Valentine’s
argument, which is quite common, was that US war mongering was (1) reactionary
and (2) not the default position of the United States. But what if he is wrong?
What if the anger and frustration felt stemmed not from alleged “moral and
psychological prohibitions,” but rather from political life generally? That is,
anger and frustration are parts of political life as normally lived and, hence,
aren’t reactionary at all. Political life is in its normal state not
characterized by moral and psychological prohibitions, but tends toward
conflict, violence, war. And if that is the case, then the political
task is or should be leashing and not unleashing governments to minimize such
conflicts, violence, and war mongering.
Valentine’s
view is more conventional: “ideological states of siege” aren’t normally part
of political life, at least not in the United States. They are created by acts such
as the attacks of 9/11. By this view, the US wasn’t acting ideologically prior
to 9/11, which is an interesting argument given that the US did wage war in
Vietnam, while both the Carter and the Clinton administrations also waged war,
Carter in Afghanistan and Clinton in Iraq. Given these wars and other US
actions, is it plausible to think that the US was not acting ideologically
prior to 9/11, as Valentine suggests? But because Valentine assumes that US
politics isn’t, normally, ideologically oriented, the CIA appears to him as “organized
crime,” as a criminal enterprise. Viewed ideologically, of course, the CIA is
just another bureaucratic institution dedicated to ensuring national security.
Two views
of political life have become evident. By one, political life is ordinarily
ideological, and for that reason is inherently tending toward conflict, violence,
and war. By this view, the political task should be minimizing or offsetting
these tendencies, pacifying political life as much as possible. Maybe, ala’
Socrates, this could be done by showing up the authorities, or by dissent based
on critiques of political life that reveal the limitations of all ideologies
and the ignorance of their proponents. Laughing at the ideologically oriented would
be useful.
By the
other view of political life, while human life does tend toward conflict,
violence, and war, these attributes are the result of the anarchical tendencies
of human beings. Thus, the political task is to offset these anarchical
tendencies by means of well-developed political programs and powerful
governments. Such policies and institutions will necessarily rely on
ideological appeals if they are to be successful. While problematic, ideological
politics holds great promise for ameliorating the human condition.
So, in one
view, it is the ideological character of political life that is problematic, to
say the least. By the other view, it is the ideological character of political
life that holds the promise of redeeming or ameliorating the human condition. It
is difficult to see how these differing and conflicting views can be
reconciled.
Valentine
is, so to speak, caught between these views. He sees, even feels, the
problematic character of powerful political organizations like the CIA. For
that, he should be praised. And yet he does not see the need to condemn the
CIA, except insofar as it is a criminal enterprise. In brief, he doesn’t see that the most basic problem with
the CIA isn’t that it resembles or is “organized crime,” but that it is an institution
that is driven by ideology, and not by expertise as it claims. A former CIA
agent told Valentine that many of the people attracted to CIA were looking for
“socially acceptable ways to express their criminal tendencies.” But this is
inaccurate. Many of those attracted to the CIA, like most of those attracted to
“public service,” are seeking socially acceptable ways to express their ideological
convictions, while impressing them on others with or without their consent, both
at home and abroad.
Machiavelli
summed this up succinctly: It is safer to be feared than loved because fear, unlike
love, can be instilled in human beings, thereby pacifying them and ameliorating
their conditions. And as Machiavelli pointed out, instilling fear and not being
hated go together very well, as is evident in these days of the widespread embrace and popularity of the CIA and other agencies that seek to instill fear in people by engaging in both covert and overt violence, including torture, avowedly on behalf of national security. Our national security state isn’t then a criminal
enterprise; it’s an ideological enterprise. And, thus, its abuses, its
violence, even its savagery seem necessary, even praiseworthy as evidence of
ideological or principled politics.