A Fire in the Lake

 

A Fire in the Lake

Peter Schultz

 

                  In her book, Fire in the Lake, Frances Fitzgerald analyzed America’s involvement and war-making in Vietnam. The following are some of her and some of my reflections on that enterprise.

 

                  “Americans … assumed [that] the Vietnamese [would] trust them, to take their advice with gratitude, to cooperate in their mutual enterprise of defeating the Communists. The Buddhist crisis came as a terrible shock …. Not only the Buddhists but also General Ky and Colonel Loan seemed to resent American interference. The crisis exposed the contradiction between the American desire to get the GVN [Government of Vietnam] on its feet and their desire to maintain some control over GVN politics….” [368]

 

                  “Did their [the Vietnamese] view of the United States as a ruthless, omnipotent force have something to do with their long history of colonial rule? If so, could the Americans, whatever their intentions, cope with these suspicions any better than the French…?” [ibid]

 

                  What are we witnessing here? Are we witnessing the impossibility of a cooperative colonialism? Of a peaceful colonialism? Of a progressive colonialism? Are we witnessing why the United States’ “involvement” in Vietnam, like the French involvement, was bound to fail; that is, to fail to achieve the United States’s best intentions?

 

                  Regardless of how well-intentioned US elites may have been, there was “no possible basis for cooperation between the two governments or between the Vietnamese government and the rest of the non-Communist groups in Vietnam.” [ibid] War was inevitable so long as the US chose to involve itself in Vietnam. It was the only possible outcome. Colonialism, imperialism, regardless of the intentions of the colonizers or imperialists, inevitably lead to war. As Fowler (in The Quiet American) put it: Innocence should be treated as madness and the innocent should be treated as lepers.

 

                  And this includes the best and the brightest. The most crucial knowledge is knowing the limits of the political. Only with that knowledge can well-intentioned but ultimately inhuman politics, such as that the United States practiced in Vietnam, be avoided. Ironically, those with the best of intentions, viz., the best and the brightest, are the most dangerous politically. They are like a “fire in the lake.”

Strategic Hamlets

 

Strategic Hamlets

Peter Schultz

 

                  The strategic hamlet program in Vietnam “was by far the most ambitious of the Diemist land programs,” according to Frances Fitzgerald in her book Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam.”  But it turned out that these strategic hamlets were mirages, little more than “fortified settlements that the armed forces could actually surround.” [155] “At least one American admitted that the NLF was not wrong in calling the settlements concentration camps” – without the ovens. “If the American and British officials really envisioned happy and prosperous peasants standing up to defend their villages … their wishful thinking was mighty indeed.” [157] Moreover, it was usually the case that “the circle of artillery and barbed wire enclosed a political void that waited for the NLF.”

 

                  So, on the one hand, the strategic hamlets were actually assisting the NLF, while being sold as the means of defeating them. The Americans and Diem had become allies, as it were, of the insurgents, the NLF and the communists. If this doesn’t qualify as madness, it is difficult to know what would. One of the most ambitious anti-communist programs, supported by the Americans and the Diemists, was not anti-communist at all. In fact, it might be labeled pro-communist.

 

                  Moreover, the strategic hamlet program treated Vietnamese villages and villagers as if they were the enemy. As had happened with the French, when the Americans moved in the Vietnamese became the enemy, along with the communists. Hence, it was delusional to say that the Americans were there to help the Vietnamese. They were there to defeat, which they called “modernization,” traditional Vietnamese, defeating via “modernization” or “Americanization” traditional Vietnam. Which is to say that the strategic hamlets were created in order to get some Vietnamese who were willing to kill other Vietnamese, those labeled “communists.” Talk about “wishful thinking.” The Americans in Vietnam wanted to “train” the Vietnamese; that is, to get some Vietnamese to kill or oppress other Vietnamese, by making some Vietnamese enemies of other Vietnamese. The Americans in Vietnam were facilitating civil war in Vietnam, under the guise of “helping“ the Vietnamese.  

 

                  Such civil wars lie at the roots of imperialism, which is why imperialism always involves inhuman cruelty. The Americans, just like the French, being forced to create or fortify or continue such a civil war in Vietnam needed cover stories to hide what they were in fact doing, and so embraced anti-communism and such fantasies as “the domino theory.” The strategic hamlet program could never succeed in creating “happy and prosperous peasants” but it could succeed in turning Vietnamese against Vietnamese and, thereby, serve the cause of those like the NLF who sought to unify Vietnam. So, not only did the Americans lose in Vietnam, they deserved to lose.

Secrecy

 

Secrecy

Peter Schultz

 

                  L. Fletcher Prouty in his excellent book, The Secret Team, has some interesting things to say about secrecy. For example: “a peculiar and dangerous characteristic … [is] derived [from] secrecy.” It those agents working on Pakistan, for example, are not doing so, but are working on another program, a cover story needs be developed. The story “is false – a lie.” The lie is permissible, necessary, and justified. “So if you are on a classified project, it is all right, in fact … essential, for you to lie. So you lie. The other man lies, everyone lies.” [472]

 

                  “In the Pentagon there are many offices established to do one thing. They really do not do that thing at all, but something entirely different. As a result, [many] cannot say what they are doing; or if they are forced to say something they lie.” [ibid]

 

                  When these persons lie to policy makers about their alleged analyses, they are guaranteeing failure for the simple reason that those policies undertaken are based on lies, i.e., they are not “reality based.” So, for example, a war on drugs, which is actually a way of controlling certain groups of people, e.g., blacks, is bound to fail as a war on drugs because that war is a fantasy; it is not real. It will never be successful vis-à-vis drugs, although it may be successful in incarcerating huge numbers of black people.

 

                  The Vietnam War, billed as an anti-Communist war, was bound to fail because the “communists” in Vietnam weren’t real. They were a figment of American imaginations, a label pinned on some Vietnamese to justify the war that American elites wanted to wage there. The war was real, but the communists were not. Ho Chi Minh was not, except in the imagination of some Americans, a communist, just as bin Laden to many Muslims was not a ”terrorist.” And, so, a war on terror and terrorists was bound to fail, just as the war on communism and communists in Vietnam was bound to fail.

 

                  No doubt this will sound strange to most people. But the longer you look at politics, the stranger the world becomes. For example, why is it that otherwise decent people are perfectly willing to engage in or support what have to be described as indecent, even savage acts? Why did decent, god-fearing Brits, for example, support the brutality that took place in Kenya in the 1950s? Why is it that decent, god-fearing Americans supported slavery and wars against indigenous people? How can such duplicities coexist and do so frequently? Is such duplicity intrinsic to the political? Considered empirically, that would seem to be the case.

 

                  In order to hide such duplicity, cover stories are needed, just as they are needed to hide the duplicitous character of the actions of government agencies and officials. American elites wanted to make war in Vietnam, to demonstrate their power there, and they needed cover stories which took different forms, e.g., anti-Communism or the domino theory. As Prouty pointed out with regard to the Pentagon, America elites could not say why they were making war Vietnam and, so, when they were forced to say something, they lied. Although deadly and destructive, this was merely normal political behavior. In fact, it was so normal that some politicians, like Ronald Reagan, did not even know they were lying. They believed their lies, which is more frightening than being bald-faced liars.

 

                  Truth-telliing plays no role in government and politics. Political success, such as it is, is impossible without duplicity, without lies, without making the truth disappear. And, so, those who speak the truth are subversives, are intrinsically and always enemies of the state, enemies of the establishment. Hence, Socrates’ fate, which he accepted and even counseled others to accept, e.g., Crito. Insofar as duplicity is intrinsic to the political, there is no way out, which Socrates recognized. Unless he lied, he knew he would be found guilty – because, truth be told, from a political viewpoint he was. And Socrates always sought and told the truth.

Why Presidents Cannot Just Say No

 

Why Presidents Cannot Just Say No

Peter Schultz

 

                  Nothing should be more suspect than action.

 

                  “When [the] country … enters the … world of covert operations, it creates a national Frankenstein … [so] that major factions within the Government do not know how something happened, who authorized it, and why it was done. The system begins to run itself from the moment of data input…. From the agents’ first bit of information … everything [happens] out of response-mechanisms to the [threat]. Therefore, the system must do something…. Nowhere [is] there anything built in to say ‘Stop’.” [The Secret Team, Prouty, 209-210]

 

                  JFK, in the runup to the Bay of Pigs invasion, abandoned the National Security Council [NSC] and “He allowed himself and his principal advisers to be made captives of the proponents of the plan.” Secrecy made deliberations “within the … NSC system” impossible – which is what the CIA and plan’s proponents were counting on.

 

                  And this is what “the single vision” finds desirable and is reflected by Hamilton’s praise for “energy in the executive” as the leading character of good government. Action, not deliberation, is thought to be the key to good government. And secrecy serves action while sacrificing deliberation or by sacrificing deliberation. “In the area of covert operations it is especially important to have someone of high authority in the position to say ‘No…’” The presidency, which was built for action, for “energy,” is not such an authority.

 

                  Left up to presidents, final decisions will rarely be “No.” Presidents should, it is commonly thought, be strong, should act with “secrecy and dispatch,” as Hamilton put in the Federalist. And, so, Trump’s Venezuelan war is unsurprising, as was Obama’s Afghan war, as was Bush’s Iraq war, as were Nixon’s, LBJ’s, and JFK’s Vietnam wars. Presidents rarely “Just Say No.” [Possible exceptions: JFK’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and his call for introspection and reflection in his American University address.]

Incompetence and Politics

 

Incompetence and Politics

Peter Schultz

 

                  John Paul Vann, a leading figure during the Vietnam War who dissented from the conventional wisdom regarding that war, proposed that the Americans, if they took over the war, could reform the Vietnamese military, thereby winning that war.

 

                  But what if it was the Americans and their incompetence that was losing that war? So, instead of the conventional wisdom being that “the war couldn’t be won,” the truth would be that “the Americans couldn’t win the war” because of their incompetence, an incompetence hidden behind the humongous, overwhelmingly powerful national security state of the United States.

 

                  A common thought is that progress and incompetence are incompatible, that progress is proof of competence. But what if, for example, the development of the United States into the powerful and prosperous nation it has become serves to hide an intrinsic incompetence among US elites? By this view, the existence of slavery in the United States contributed to development of the United States into a great nation, as well as hiding the incompetence that accompanied the development of that greatness. Perhaps progress and incompetence often go hand-in-hand, and, thanks in large part to slavery, the US progressed despite its incompetence.

 

                  By this view, incompetence is a key variable of American politics. So, because this phenomenon must be hidden, duplicity becomes the coin of the realm, so to speak. And centrality of incompetence appears repeatedly, for example, in Vietnam, on 9/11, in Bush’s invasion of Iraq, in Obama’s war in Afghanistan, in Cuba, Libya, Ukraine, as well as in systemic failures such as mass incarceration, the immigration crisis, the border crisis, and repeated economic failures.

 

                  Could It be that incompetence is more pronounced, more important in the political arena than, say, corruption? Could it be more important, more decisive than, say, venality? In fact, could it be that focusing on venality is a way of hiding the incompetence, the intrinsic incompetence of our elites? And insofar as that incompetence is due to the ignorance of our elites, it cuts deeper into their claims that they are legitimate rulers because ignorance, when unrecognized, is easily hidden behind claims of expertise, moral decency, or patriotic fervor. The war in Vietnam was waged by a US military that relied on large amounts of “intelligence” or data about their war, as well as claims of being fervent US patriots. Under these claims of data-driven expertise and of being committed patriots, the incompetence of the military and political elites pretty much disappeared. Even the Pentagon Papers focused on the duplicity of these elites without indicating that that duplicity was covering up a pervasive incompetence. Perhaps then it would be advisable to focus not so much on “the character issue,” as on “the incompetence issue.” Incompetent experts and incompetent patriots are problematic in ways that overwhelming power cannot offset.  

What Was the Vietnam War?

 

What Was the Vietnam War?

Peter Schultz

 

                  What was the Vietnam War? Was it a “mistake” or was it a “culmination?’ That is, was it an aberration that could be blamed on certain personalities or certain theories, such as “the domino theory?” Or was it the culmination of decades of American foreign policy that was traceable to the most basic features of the American political order? How you answer this question goes a long way to explaining how you understand politics and the political.

 

                  Many, maybe even most people like to think that the Vietnam War and America’s other wars, e.g., in Iraq or Afghanistan, were distinct or peculiar events best understood by experts who have studied them. But what if the Vietnam War – and other wars – were integral to the most basic features of the American political order, what might be called America’s “regime?” As such intrinsic events, changing personnel, either partisans or bureaucratic, would not change them, except perhaps marginally. Even those with pacifistic tendencies would, if they acquired power, find themselves driven toward war because that is what the regime needed and facilitated. There would be no “Vietnam syndrome,” that is, no syndrome peculiar to the Vietnam War. Insofar as there were syndromes, they would more appropriately be labelled “American syndromes”, and they could not be dealt with unless the basic political order was changed. And such changes would require being radical, that is, going to the roots of the established order. Changing presidents or changing policies would be of very little usefulness in rearranging the established order in the United States.

 

                  Such radicalism will rarely prevail because, well, because it is radical and, as such, would be opposed by the most prominent, most authoritative, and most powerful components of the established order. Those who are empowered and honored by the established order are unlikely to see the need or have any desire for changing it. After all, it worked for them, identifying them as being the most virtuous Americans. They were successful. As such, they would be identified as “the best and the brightest.” That is, they are the best that the established order has to offer.

 

                  But, ironically, by electing, honoring, and empowering the best and the brightest, the failures of established order would be not only maintained but fortified. And these failures would need to be covered over, hidden, disappeared. A politics of duplicity will be necessary and would become the coin of the realm, so to speak.

 

Regarding the Vietnam War, JFK practiced duplicity to try to end America’s war there, while LBJ practiced duplicity to make the war there an American war. And Nixon practiced duplicity for four years in order to achieve “peace with honor” and end America’s involvement there, at the cost of more than 20,000 American soldiers and over at least several hundred thousand Vietnamese. And for that deadly duplicity, Henry Kissinger was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize and Nixon was reelected in one of the greatest landslides in American history. Both achieved, at least temporarily, greatness and the established order was maintained and fortified. Ironically, however, that meant that more “Vietnams” were guaranteed, as indeed has proven to be the case.

 

And so it goes. While mistakes were made by the United States that contributed to its embrace of war in Vietnam, General Giap was more correct when he asserted it was America’s imperialism that led to its tragedy in Vietnam.

The Trial of Oliver North

 

The Trial of Oliver North

Peter Schultz

 

                  It is important to understand how the trial of Oliver North, and others, were part of a cover up regarding Iran-Contra. But it is important to understand that what was being covered up was that the default position, so to speak, of politics and government is failure. This is always what needs to be covered up. And turning politicians and bureaucrats (both civilian and military) into criminals serves that cause. How and why? At least two reasons.

 

                  Criminals like North can claim, quite truthfully, that they were well-intentioned. This is what North did, turning himself into a hero when he testified before Congress. But in fact, almost all criminals are well-intentioned insofar as, ala’ Tony Soprano or Michael Corleone, they do what they do for their own well-being and the well-being of their families and their friends. Malcolm Little, as small-time hood, was a better American, seeking status, wealth, and some excitement, than he was after he became Malcolm X, black revolutionary seeking to change American politics and society.

 

                  In the movie, Traffic, there is a revealing scene where the father and the boyfriend are looking for the father’s daughter in the ghetto. The father remarks how shocking life is in the ghetto, but the boyfriend shuts him up by pointing out that the social and economic order worked quite well for those involved, so well that if it were transported to the father’s toney neighborhood, young people would adopt it readily, and give up “going to law school” and other such endeavors. In other words, ghetto youths and wealthy youths are not all that different as they have the same motivations, the same intentions and, so, their alleged differences are not real. They are contrived to justify a War on Drugs.

 

                  Secondly, criminals are arrested, charged, and tried for certain activities, which means that they actually did somethings, did them successfully. Their actions are criminal, but they accomplished things, e.g., they built Las Vegas, they created vast and immensely wealthy drug cartels composed of huge economies and powerful players. Being a criminal means being competent. Whereas Reagan, North, Bush, et. al., were, as politicians, incompetent as they achieved via Iran Contra virtually nothing. Charging or treating them as criminals hides their incompetence, their failures.

 

                  So, politicians and bureaucrats must practice deception in order to hide their incompetence. But, more importantly, they must practice deception to hide the fact that failure is the default position of politics and government. Why is that so? Because the political arena is composed of the real and the contrived, of the real and the fantastical, of the real and the illusionary.

 

                  Take the War on Drugs: The drugs are real, but the dealers and users are not real. That is, they are real people, but they are not the people we think they are. As Traffic illustrates, the users are members of our own families and, so, as Michael Douglas’s character says when he quits being drug czar, a war on drugs is actually a war on our families and he didn’t want or know how to do that.

 

                  Or consider the war in Vietnam. Vietnam was real but South Vietnam was not. It was not a real country with a real government or a real army. South Vietnam was an American fantasy, an illusion, which led American elites to be delusional, cruelly delusional.

 

                  When you deal in illusions, you are bound to fail or to make things worse. It is difficult to call the Vietnam war “pro-American” because it left the United States demoralized and weaker militarily and economically than it had been before the US took over the war. Ditto the War on Drugs, which led to a war on families and to mass incarceration, which gave the United States to one of the largest prison populations, per capita, on the planet. If that’s success, it is a strange definition of success. It certainly should not be described as “pro-American.”

 

                  And how was the Vietnam war “anti-Communist” when the North Vietnamese economy actually grew during the American bombing campaigns? Moreover, the war solidified the relations between the Vietnamese, the Russians, and the Chinese, thereby unifying the Communist “world.” And the Chinese and the Russians sacrificed exactly zero soldiers in that war. Again, if that is considered successful “anti-Communism,” it is a strange definition of success.

 

                  These are the failures that need to be covered up. More importantly, the fact that failure is default position of the political, that failure in intrinsic to politics must be covered up. It would be quite significant if people realized that despite them thinking that ordinarily politics succeeds, the reverse was the case, viz., that politics and government ordinarily fail.

 

                  Consider two books in this regard: Why Empires Always Fail and Seeing Like a State. The former points out, with a wide-ranging history of empires, both ancient and recent, that empires always fail and always are based on and embrace inhuman cruelty. The latter points out that government projects almost never succeed and certainly don’t succeed without extraneous, i.e., unplanned measures occurring.

 

                  By criminalizing Ollie North, the establishment allowed him to successfully play the role of hero and to appear as something other than an incompetent, shallow Marine. And that, of course, is how we don’t want to think of our warrior Marines. It would be too revealing. But, more importantly, criminalizing North was a way to hide the fact that the default position of politics is failure. And this is, perhaps, the most important cover-up of all.

LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

 

LBJ, Nixon, and Vietnam

Peter Schultz

 

                  As David Halberstam put it in his book The Best and the Brightest, “he [LBJ] could not make the next step … the liquidation of [the war] politically.” [659]

 

                  Why not? Because this was a big step, a radical step and LBJ could not go to the roots of his politics, the roots of his delusions. He was blind to the fundamental flaws of his politics, e.g., how his politics privileged “toughness” and not wisdom or even competence, as competence and wisdom require an awareness of limits, a sense of irony, if you please.

 

                  Nixon was in the same boat. His continuation of the war wasn’t only or even primarily about his winning re-election in 1972, as argued in Fatal Politics, a most worthwhile book. His savagery had political roots, roots which Nixon always affirmed. So, for Nixon, Vietnam and the war was “not a compelling tragedy … it was an issue like others, something to maneuver on….” [661] As a result, “To an extraordinary degree … Nixon … repeated the mistakes and miscalculations of the Johnson Administration…. Nixon saw South Vietnam as a real country with a real President and a real army, rich in political legitimacy, and … capable of performing [as] demanded by American aims and rhetoric.” [665]

 

                  So, contra Fatal Politics, Nixon wasn’t shrewdly maneuvering in Nam to ensure his re-election. No, he was “in a position of not being able to win, not being able to get out, not being able to get our prisoners home, only being able to lash out and bomb.” [665] Nixon/Kissinger were trapped – by their politics – just as LBJ, et. al., had been trapped. Nixon “still believed in [the] essential mission….” [664] Nixon/Kissinger were just as blind as LBJ had been, as JFK had been, as Eisenhower and Truman had been. They all believed in “the essential mission” as it was understood post-WW II, viz., that US hegemony would save the world by bringing it peace, prosperity, and freedom. Such were the prevailing delusions that led to the Vietnam War. But as David Halberstam wrote, that as the war went on, “Americans were finding, [there was] no light at the end of the tunnel, only greater darkness.” [665] Sounds like a finding worth repeating, especially these days.

Government Deception

 

Government Deception

Peter Schultz

 

So ironic: to read this critique [in Walsh’s book Firewall] of “government by deception” as if there’s any other kind of government! This is a wonderful illustration of how Walsh’s team and function, during the Iran-Contra scandal, participated in and facilitated, unknowingly perhaps, the real cover up, that is, the cover up of the political, and it’s intrinsic incompetence, futility, and injustice. All of these investigations and no one asked:  What was accomplished? Or more to the point: Why was so little accomplished?

 

By trying North, e.g., Walsh et. al. Implied he had actually accomplished something, that he had done something! As a criminal, ala’ Walsh et. al., North could appear to be a hero when he was just incompetent! Incompetence isn’t criminal; it isn’t much of anything! North wasn’t a hero; he was an incompetent asshole. But then we can’t have our warrior Marines seen as incompetent assholes, can we? That would be too revealing!

 

[By the by, the same applies to Nixon’s behavior in Watergate: he wasn’t a criminal; he was just another incompetent asshole! Criminalizing Nixon hid his incompetence and made him look competent, thereby covering up the incompetence that’s intrinsic to politics and government.] 

 

So it goes! 

 

Unitary Executive

 

Unitary Executive

Peter Schultz

 

Issue posed by Cheney, et. al.: Is the “unitary executive” constitutional? This question ignores or covers up the question, Is a unitary executive politically beneficial? The most important guestion isn’t,  does it exist, but is should it exist? 

 

Cheney et. al. argued that presidents can’t do their jobs unless there is a unitary executive. In other words, the “centralization of authority in … presidents alone is … crucial….” 

 

But this is true only for a particular conception of the president’s “job.” Centralization of authority only makes sense given a particular conception of president’s job. If the president’s job isn’t domination, then the centralization of authority in that office doesn’t make sense. And, of course, if domination is illusionary, both as a fact and as a good thing, then the centralization of authority ought to be rejected because it will lead to failure. If the political is a madhouse, and domination of it is illusionary, then what Cheney, et. al., take as an unalloyed good thing, centralization of executive authority, will lead to failure over and over again, e.g., in Vietnam, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Ukraine, in Cuba, in the Middle East, in Latin America, etc., etc., etc. 

 

Ironically, it was during the covert centralization of executive authority in the Reagan Administration that the failures that made up what is called Iran-Contra came to be. But this was successfully covered up by the Congressional investigations and by the OIC under Walsh. Put differently, it was imperialism and imperialistic policies that led to the Iran-Contra failures. Why? Because although imperialism looks politically beneficial, it isn’t. In fact, like the political itself, it’s madness. This is what needed to be covered up in Iran-Contra, in Vietnam, in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.

 

And if you can transform imperialists into criminals, ala’ as was done to Nixon during Watergate and as Walsh tried to do with North and Poindexter, then you can successfully cover up the madness of imperialism and of the political. Nixon, as a criminal, became the scapegoat who was used to cover up the madness of imperialism and of the political. (An article of impeachment that dealt with Nixon’s actions in Southeast Asia, i.e., with his imperialistic politics, was voted down in the House of Representatives.) Ditto regarding the criminalization of North and Poindexter. 

US Politics: Delusional Incompetence

 

US Politics: Delusional Incompetence

Peter Schultz

 

                  The following is from David Halberstam’s book The Best and the Brightest, wherein it is clear that the best and the brightest Americans failed in Vietnam.

 

“As in China, it was a modern army against a feudal one, though it was not perceived by Western eyes, particularly Western military eyes, which saw the ARVN was well equipped, with radios, airplanes, artillery and fighter planes, and that the Vietcong had virtually nothing, except light artillery pieces. Western observers believed the reverse, believed that the ARVN was a legitimate and real army, and that the Vietcong, more often than not wearing black pajamas, not even uniformed, were the fake army, the unreal one – why, they did not even have a chain of command. It was ironic; the United States had created an army in its own image, an army which existed primarily on paper, and which was linked to U.S. aims and ambitions and no way reflected its own society. We believed in the army, the South Vietnamese did not…. [There was an] illusion about a dynamic new leadership that would persist relentlessly through the years….”  [167]

 

                  Americans were delusionally incompetent, blinded by their power and deluded by it. Losing in Vietnam was “unthinkable” for Americans and, so, after they lost, that loss had to be disappeared. Amazingly, Nixon’s Peace with Honor was accepted as a kind of victory, even after the “North” Vietnamese took over and renamed Saigon “Ho Chi Minh City.”

Random Thoughts: The Politics of Conspiracies

Random Thoughts: The Politics of Conspiracies

Peter Schultz

 

                  Iran-Contra: Meese requested an independent prosecutor “to avoid even the appearance of a cover-up.” This was ironic insofar as such an appointment facilitated the on-going cover-up by transforming political issues - political incompetence and ignorance - into legal issues, issues of alleged criminality. The focus became alleged illicit behavior, not incompetent, ignorant political conduct (or imperialistic conduct). Politically delusional/imperialistic officials were transformed into possible criminals. And then, for the most part, exonerated of any indictable criminality, most importantly Reagan, Bush, Shultz, and Weinberger. No criminals, no incompetent imperialists here! It’s all good!

[Which are worse, competent or incompetent imperialists? Just wondering. Ironically, there is an argument in favor of political and governmental incompetence. 🤪✌️] 

 

Random Thoughts #2

                  Nir’s and Reed’s and Cummings conspiracy theories regarding Iran-Contra assessed. These speculations have interesting political consequences, viz., obscuring, even disappearing two prominent characteristics of American politics and politics in general, incompetence and ignorance. 

 

Hasenfus shot down and numerous coincidences are visible. See below. Conclusion: “No, sir, it’s all too convenient.” Maybe but so too are these conspiracy theories. Even more convenient than the alternatives. 

 

(1) conspiracy theories cover up incompetence, which was by and large ignored during the Iran-Contra investigations. Even the criminality theme makes incompetence disappear. Watergate, for example: Nixon wasn’t incompetent but was a wily, deceitful, manipulating criminal and, hence, very dangerous. Iran-Contra: North wasn’t an incompetent but a super patriot who, like many other super patriots, got carried away by his virtue, his patriotism in attempts to serve Ronald Reagan loyally, rescue hostages, and re-establish Iran as an ally of the US and the West. He was, potentially, a hero, which is often how Marines are seen. Or, for others, those against him, he was a criminal, a bad person, but not an incompetent, ignorant person. And, of course, it is almost impossible for Americans to think, accept that a lt. col. in the USMC was an incompetent screw-up. No? 

 

Conspiracy theories help fortify the idea that our elites, military and political, aren’t screw-ups or delusional. 

 

(2) Such theories make politics seem rational, by and large. That is, not crazy, not a madhouse, not full of sound and fury signifying nothing. So they make nihilism disappear; they make the nihilism question disappear or the nihilistic phenomenon look like the manifestation of psychological dis-ease. Nihilism is not intrinsic to the political. Insofar as this is not the case, then it may be said that such theories foster ignorance of a very high order about the political. 

 

(3) Such theories detract from another ignored theme of the Iran-Contra investigations: the capabilities of the Sandinistas, the Iranians, the Israelis, and Hezbollah and other terrorists. Kidnapping, especially kidnapping CIA agents, like IEDs, like 9/11, like caves, like bikes (in Vietnam) illustrate intelligence, savvy, and calculation of relatively high orders. Hence, the fact that the US got outplayed in Iran and Nicaragua is covered up. Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, North, Poindexter, McFarlane, Meese, even leaders in the US Congress all got outplayed, just as the US got outplayed in Oklahoma City and 9/11. 

 

Covering up these phenomena cover up the role ignorance played and plays in politics. Ignorance not only of one’s enemies but also ignorance of the political itself. Power, even great, unrivaled power is not sufficient to dominate, to emerge victorious in the political realm. And insofar as that goes, it also means that the pursuit of dominance, of hegemony is bound to fail and is bound to lead to inhuman cruelty. Imperialism is not only ultimately futile; it is also ultimately inhuman. This is ignorance of a very high order, and seems to be an ignorance that pervades the political realm. 

 

(4) the Office of the Independent Prosecutor, with its focus on criminality has the same implications and consequences by turning political phenomena into legal phenomena, which makes political delusion disappear and then reappear as criminality. But which is more significant, political delusions or crimes, insanity or venality? The answer seems pretty obvious, no? 

 

Does this mean there are no conspiracies? Absolutely not. There are, all over the place. But care needs be taken so they don’t blind us to the incompetence and ignorance that characterize the political. NB: Reed and Cumming and NIr present to us what can only be described as a movie, Hollywood version of what was going on, with Reagan the bad guy, and Bush as the good guy who was trying to unseat the bad guy to re-establish or fortify a status quo that was, before Reagan became president, quite sound and decent. And, of course, being from Yale and with an American Yankee pedigree, Bush could be trusted to right wrongs and get America back on track again. Not quite “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” but enough like it to make me smile. Ironically though:

 

• "'Except something has gone wrong.  It's been over nine months since the shootdown, and we now feel that Reagan has somehow miraculously been able to survive.  I was able to talk to North early on, and apparently, right after the incident, your attorney general and the secretary of state seized important documents and were able to contain the scandal by eliminating most of the damaging evidence.  Like I say, it’s been a miracle, but so far Reagan appears to have fought off the coup'" (Reed & Cummings 360-361).
•  

Apparently, the political realm is a madhouse after all! 

 

 

Thoughts on George H. W. Bush and Extremism

 

Thoughts on George H. W. Bush and Extremism

Peter Schultz

 

                  In his book, Firewall, Lawrence E. Walsh quotes Anthony Lewis’s comments on George H. W. Bush regarding his lies about his involvement in Iran-Contra, to wit:

 

“Surely there is a level of brazen falsehood that they should be ashamed to breach.” [459]

 

                  So, ala’ Lewis, there are acceptable falsehoods politicians may tell and not be ashamed. Let’s say, “Yes, that’s true.” But what does it teach us about politics and politicians?” Well, that’s easy: falsehoods, up to a certain point, are acceptable, maybe even beneficial or honorable. The noble lie, for example.

 

                  So, the debate as Lewis would frame it would be: Did Bush’s lies – because we know he lied – reach the level of being shameful? He, Bush, shouldn’t be criticized for lying; but he should be criticized for brazenly, shamefully lying.

 

                  Further, take note that the issue at stake – Should the United States have sold arms to recover hostages – has disappeared completely. Or: Are the lives of hostages worth selling some arms for? Or: is it wise to always not deal with terrorists? Even if that means torture and death for hostages?  Seems a bit extreme, does it not? It even seem to be an extremism like the extremism of the hostage-takers.

 

                  Is extremism, like lying, intrinsic to politics? Does affirming the political mean affirming extremism? It would be good to know.

The Uses and Limitations of Secrecy and Duplicity

 

The Uses and Limitations of Secrecy and Duplicity

Peter Schultz

 

                  James Rosen’s biography of John Mitchell, The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate illustrates that secrecy and duplicity are intrinsic to politics and that they are both useful and harmful. Rosen seems to think that it was secrecy and duplicity that brought Nixon down, without realizing that secrecy and duplicity are intrinsic to politics. To wit:

 

“The two [Nixon and Kissinger] had come full circle. Less than two weeks after learning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spying – a ‘lesion’ Nixon admitted having created with his and Kissinger’s incessant back-channel plotting – the president had blithely resumed scheming with his national security advisor, whom he had … described as ‘not a good security risk,’ to use the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a back channel to circumvent the secretary of defense.” [179-80]

 

                  “Had Liddy forsaken the code of omerta, the testimony of Dean and Magruder against Mitchell would have crumbled.” [262]

 

                  “Mitchell harbored few illusions about Haig, whom he came to consider ‘a power grabber …  pleased to abandon Nixon to maintain his power base in Washington and the military.’  Shown the transcript of the Ehrlichman-Welander interrogation many years later, the former attorney general declared that had Nixon seen it, he would never have appointed Haig … as chief of staff. Had that happened, of course, historians would never have had to grapple … with …  questions about Haig’s conduct – and loyalties – in the latter stages of Watergate: the disclosure of Nixon’s taping system, the origins and discovery of the eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap, the pardon.

 

“Thus, by the time he died, Mitchell realized his burial of the Moorer-Radford scandal  –  undertaken to spare the nation a court martial involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to give Nixon a ‘whip hand’ over them  –  effectually sealed the president’s own fate. By allowing men he distrusted, and who distrusted him, to remain in place in the White House and at the Pentagon, Nixon ensured that the cultural secrecy and paranoia that infused his first term persisted until the Watergate scandal aborted his presidency.” [175-176]

 

Secrecy and duplicity permeated the Nixon administration but then they are intrinsic to politics, and they flourish in the political arena, even more so, apparently, than the likes of Nixon and Mitchell were aware. Mitchell may have harbored few illusions about Haig as “a power grabber,” but he did harbor illusions about the political. As Machiavelli might have counseled him, Mitchell needed to be dis-llusioned by learning that persons like Haig, who seem most committed to seeking the good, are actually seeking power and fame.  In that way then, Mitchell might have learned the lesson Machiavelli emphasized most heavily, viz., “to learn to be able not to be good.”

 

 

Our Problems

Peter Schultz

 

 

We Americans tend to personalize our problems or the causes of our problems. So, presently, many are committed to the idea that Trump is the cause of our problems. And there is no doubt that is partially correct. But our problems are also political, meaning traceable to the Constitution itself. 

 

The default position, so to speak, of politics is despotism. Politics tends towards despotism, toward repression, and toward war. That is politics “natural disposition,” as human history and our current state of affairs illustrates. Some Anti-Federalists thought of government and its politics as a mechanical screw that, once it was created, would turn down, slowly but steadily repressing the people. The people could resist but they could not reverse the downward direction of the political screw. With government and politics, we humans are always being screwed! 

 

Most Federalists rejected this account of government and politics, seeing government and politics as the engine of progress. So, they created a powerful government that would appeal, would draw in the ambitious, those who loved fame, which Hamilton called the leading passion of the noblest minds. Get the ambitious, the lovers of fame into your government, allow them to control your politics and impressive public projects intended to secure the common good would follow, as night follows day. Such projects would even be seen as normal, and as required if a person wanted to become a great president sitting atop a great nation. 

 

But if the default position of politics is despotism, then the most prominent political actors would prove to be drawn to despotism, as Lincoln pointed out in his address on “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions.” If the default position of politics is despotism, then it is intrinsically dangerous to entrust anyone with a great deal of power or to try to draw into your government those who love fame and seek to prove they deserve it. Benjamin Franklin pointed this out during the constitutional convention when he proposed not paying presidents because creating an office that appealed to the avaricious and the ambitious would lead to endless political battles and the peaceful would not seek such offices, would not be part of the political or governmental scene. Avarice and ambition combined are, Franklin implied, political nitro glycerin. Besides, as Lincoln pointed out in his “Perpetuation” address, fame can be harvested by freeing slaves or enslaving freemen. So when fame, which is a kind of immortality, is the goal, justice and even humanity become less attractive and, perhaps, tend to disappear from the political scene. Something which seems all-too-evident currently. 

 

Trump is not a human being who should be respected. Far from it. But he is playing in an arena, the political arena, that gives him, so to speak, home field advantage. In that arena, respectability is of very limited value, as has been shown by more than a few presidents and other politicians. And, as some Anti-Federalists realized, there is little that can be done to limit the repression, the violence Trump’s rule will cause. Decisions were made a long time ago and now there is only acceptance. [The Counselor] Or as Billy Pilgrim reminds us: So it goes. [Slaughterhouse Five] 

 

Comments on The Rule of Empires

 

Comments on The Rule of Empires

Peter Schultz

 

                  Timothy H. Parsons has written an excellent book entitled The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fail.

 

                  In his concluding chapter, Parsons comments on George Bush’s invasion of Iraq as part of his project to liberate Iraq by deposing Saddam Hussein and making Iraq democratic. Referring to critics of Bush, Parson’s wrote:

 

                  “The critics of Operation Iraqi Freedom often overlook [certain] realities. To be sure, scholars of empire such as Nicholas Dirks did their part by linking theorists, politicians, and military contractors that profited from the invasion of Iraq with the conquistadors, nabobs, and other specialist groups behind earlier imperial projects…. [Moreover], most opponents of President Bush’s preemptive war made the mistake of equating empire and imperialism solely with the unjust use of hard power…. Empires are indeed immoral, but it would have been more convincing to argue against the Iraq invasion by using historical precedents to show why it was doomed to fail. Instead, the Bush administration’s leftist critics assumed that empire was still practical; they just differed from the neoconservatives and imperial apologists in branding it a sin.” [426-27]

 

                  Parson’s view is that “it is simply no longer feasible to reorder another society through military force alone…. The central mistake running through much of the debate over the Iraqi occupation was the assumption that imperial methods were still effective and could be put to legitimate uses. The Bush administration … planners made the fundamental mistake of believing their own legitimizing rhetoric.” [427]

 

                  But it should be emphasized that the failure of empires or of imperialism is not merely a historical phenomenon. It is also a political phenomenon.  Empires and other imperialistic projects destroy themselves. They are, for various reasons, unmaintainable, even futile. And one of the reasons even the leftist critics of Bush’s imperial project assume that empire is practical is because they are still “believers;” that is, they don’t realize that ultimately, like empires, politics is futile. Failure is intrinsic to the political. Or as Socrates put it: Only when philosophers rule of rulers become philosophers will humankind be cured of its ills. And those, like George Bush, who think that they have a moral obligation to right the world’s wrongs will repeatedly subject the world to savagery, death, and destruction.

Connections: JFK, Vietnam, and the British Empire

 

Connections: JFK, Vietnam, and the British Empire

Peter Schultz

 

                  JFK said he would pull out of Vietnam after winning the 1964 presidential election. This means, among other things, that JFK was willing to wage war in Nam – and defend waging it – in order to win the 1964 election. Winning the election was more important than ending (or losing) the war. Winning re-election was more important than doing justice or ending the injustice of the war.

 

                  JFK did not take on the injustice of the war; that is, he did not take on American imperialism. He was, essentially, an imperialist.

 

                  JFK’s version of success: ending the Vietnam War without undermining American imperialism, dominance, hegemony. The war was “a mistake,” but American imperialism, hegemony was not.

 

                  What follows once you embrace imperialism/ hegemony? Don’t you end up with war(s)? Don’t you end up with Kenya, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Ukraine, and Iraq?

 

                  Plus, you end up justifying imperialism. That is, you cannot see the injustice of empire, of imperialism. You can only see its justice, despite the appearance of great injustices like those committed by the British in Kenya and Malaysia or those committed by the United States in Vietnam. As a result, there is no way out.

 

                  Caroline Elkins’ title for her excellent history of the British Empire, Legacy of Violence, is misleading. It should have been “Legacy of Imperialism” because imperialism was/is the root issue, not violence. General Giap was correct: (1) Robert McNamara was an imperialist and (2) the Vietnam war occurred because he – and the United States – was imperialist. To catalogue “the mistakes” that allegedly led to the war obfuscates, “disappears” the root phenomenon, imperialism. McNamara’s alleged realism blinded him – and us – to reality.

Thoughts on Elkins "Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire"

 

Thoughts on Elkins’ Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire

Peter Schultz

 

Here are some thoughts that arose as I was reading Caroline Elkins very fine history of the British Empire, mainly pertaining to understanding the political.

 

#1

Which more accurately describes the political: Elkins’ “systematized violence” or “pathological violence?” The former carries with it justifications: it’s ordered violence created by rational persons and bureaucratized. The latter calls it what it actually is, “sickness.” 

Elkins tends to rationalize the Mau Mau: “It was a rational response of rural people seeking to understand the enormous socioeconomic and political changes taking place…while attempting to respond collectively to new and unjust realities.” (547) 
Sounds like the Kikuyu would be open to and would profit from seminars on their situation! 

Politics, given its injustices, produces rage; and did so both in the Brits in Kenya and in the Kikuyu. Both sides responded pathologically, which is to say they responded politically. The result: pathological violence. 

“Going postal:” pathological violence creating more pathological violence. Is telling people that they have a constitutionally guaranteed right to weapons a good idea? Kirk’s fate might be taken to indicate it isn’t. Oh, there’s that irony again!  

 

#2

What Elkins labels “legalized lawlessness” is more accurately called “pathological lawlessness.” This is similar to her “systematized violence,” which I think should be labeled “pathological violence.” Elkins has trouble getting to the point of recognizing that the political is the arena of the pathological. But I believe it is this recognition that is the gateway, so to speak, to political philosophy. The absence of this recognition is what characterizes “believers,” those who affirm the political like Carl Schmidt or Alexander Hamilton, et. al. The absence of this recognition is what distinguishes political thought from political philosophy. 

Insofar as the political is the arena of the pathological, is it wise to guarantee that people have a constitutional right to weaponize? Is it wise, generally, to militarize such an arena? And Aristotle’s description of the best location for a polis as one that requires only a minimal amount of militarization is a reflection that he too understood the political as pathologically violent and lawless, intrinsically so. ( Austen’s Wickham is a reflection that she understood this as well., as well as her joke about anal sex among the navy’s “rear admirals!”) 

Just sayin’. 

Politics: Normalizing the Abnormal

 

Politics: Normalizing the Abnormal

Peter Schultz

 

 

Oh, but it is normal; it's the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means. 

 

Remember 1963? 1968? Remember the Bay of Pigs, JFK/Dallas, RFK, MLK, Malcolm X, Chicago 1968, Kent State, Jackson State, George Wallace, Fred Hampton, My Lai, the Phoenix program, Watergate, Reagan shot, Ford shot at, 9/11, the War on Terror, ”MIssion Accomplished,” 20+ years in Afghanistan, 1/6? 

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/07/opinion/trump-senate-democrats-shutdown.html