The Duplicity of American Statesmanship

 

The Duplicity of American Statesmanship

Peter Schultz

 

                  “To avoid personal and political calamity, Nixon needed … South [Vietnam] to survive a year or two after he brought the last American troops home. If it lasted eighteen months or so, Saigon’s fall might not look like it was Nixon’s fault. Kissinger had a special name for this face-saving period of time. “We want a decent interval.” [p. 30, Fatal Politics, Ken Hughes]

 

                  It needs emphasis that Kissinger’s interval would be anything but “decent.” It would be indecent in both effect and purpose. Its effects would include more death and destruction as Nixon and Kissinger allowed the war to drag on, while prolonging the captivity of America’s POWs, held by the North Vietnamese to be returned as a result of a settlement. And its purpose was to secure and fortify Nixon’s and Kissinger’s alleged bona fides as statesmen. Death, destruction, captive POWs, all for the sake of vanity, or what might be called narcissism in spades.

 

                  And there is more. “Through the Russians and Chinese, Nixon and Kissinger could offer Hanoi something valuable in return for a ‘decent interval’ – a clear shot at taking the South without fear of American intervention.” [p. 30]

 

                  The scale of this duplicity is staggering but, apparently, quite normal politically. To serve their own personal and political needs and desires, Nixon and Kissinger were working with Hanoi and on behalf of Hanoi, thereby undermining the existence of South Vietnam. And it is worth recalling that Kissinger was awarded a Noble Peace prize for his duplicity and Nixon was rewarded with a landslide re-election for his duplicity, as well as being hailed as the statesman who welcomed China into the world order. Both Nixon and Kissinger were named Time magazine’s “Men of the Year” in 1972. In politics, the duplicitous are well-rewarded and even regarded as “statesmen” of the highest order. So it goes.